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Abstract: Constitutional law and state building in Kosovo was conducted with the goal of creating a 
multi-ethnic society; this impacted on the nature of the international administration from 1999-2008 
and also the nature of Kosovo’s political/judicial structures after independence. The determination to 
forge a multi-ethnic society impacted on the design of various institutions and has had the perverse 
effect of cementing ethnic divisions and enabling certain parties/groups opposed to the existence of 
Kosovo to infiltrate Kosovo’s institutions. As a result, the creation of an inclusive “Kosovo” identity 
has been somewhat paralyzed. This paper aims to revisit constitutional history development of Kosovo 
to try and make sense of the current state of affairs in the Constitution of Kosovo.   
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1. Politics of Enforcing A “Multi-Ethnic” Society in Kosovo-A Brief History of 
Constitutional Development and State Building in Kosovo  
1.1. What was the Nature of the State Building in Kosovo 1999-2008? The 
International Community’s Policy of Imposing “Multi Ethnicity” 
The birth of the Kosovo state must be understood in the context of the exceptional 
conditions of ex-communist Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Kosovo’s state-building 
process began long before its Declaration of Independence in February 2008 and 
after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) intervention in 1999. Several 
external and actors, including the United Nations, European Union, and the United 
States, contributed much over a long period of time to establish the requisite 
institutional framework for a functioning governmental structure.  
The nature of state building in Kosovo in this period is characterized with a heavy 
involvement of international community in the post war Kosovo after 1999, and their 
seemingly obsession to create an ideal multi ethnic society in Kosovo. The concept 
of multi ethnicity was introduced and reinforced in the state building process despite 
the fact that demographics did not support such a concept, and in fact history shows 
that precisely the ethnicity was the cause for conflict in Kosovo and several accounts 
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point in this direction.1 So the question is where “international community” in charge 
to administer Kosovo not aware of the historical facts or perhaps the policy proposals 
that they sent to their supervisors, in paper sounded great and  nobody cared actually 
to question them? We will never know. What is a fact is that international community 
instead of focusing in creation of institutional mechanisms for interethnic 
cooperation with the aim to create an inclusive political community they kept 
producing policy documents that were out of touch with the reality and indeed 
produced contrary effects which resulted in cemented ethnic divisions in Kosovo. 
The fact that United Nations Resolution 1244 was vague about the future political 
status of Kosovo did not help at all. Rob Atkins argues that the institutional designs 
intended to promote representative government and manage ethnic conflict have 
institutionalized ethnicity as a key resource in political competition. International 
interventions have thus continued and extended processes of ethnicization that take 
place in ethnic mobilization and conflicts.2 
The presiding lines of this section is an account of these ineffective policy efforts of 
“international community” to forge a “multi ethnic” society in Kosovo through 
institutional design in the period between 1999 until the independence of Kosovo 
and how this impacted the ensuing process of state building after the independence. 
This period is marked with what in my view was a blind persistence of “international 
community” to forge a multi ethnic concept in Kosovo after the establishment of 
international administration under UNMIK. The basis of this policy perhaps can be 
traced back to the Rambouillet Accords – eventually signed by the Kosovo Albanian 
delegation but rejected by the Yugoslavs – which served as the basic template for 
many of UNMIK’s later policy initiatives.  The Agreement included the statement, 
which read “…the preservation and promotion of the national, cultural, and linguistic 
identity of each national community in Kosovo are necessary for the harmonious 
development of a peaceful society”3. The Agreement set a goal that of interethnic 
harmony in the Kosovo society. Hehir argues that it was not at all clear, however, 
that the preservation of Serbian and Albanian identities was required for there to be 
peace in Kosovo; in fact, evidence suggested that so long as these identities were 
preserved, let alone promoted, they would actively undermine peace and stability in 
the province4.  
The evidence from the theory and the practice showed that policy of division of 
power in ethnic lines actually cemented the ethnic divisions within the societies and 
brought about failed states. As Marko argues in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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(BiH) the combination of entrenched and reinforced ethno-politics and the counter-
productive institutions-building strategies of the international community were 
doomed to fail1. Further Professor Marko argues that; all forms of racism and ethno-
nationalism are based on the same structural code, which is characterized by the 
unilinear equation of identity=equality=inclusion, or, the other way round, 
difference=inequality=exclusion2. 
Very little was done in the post war Kosovo regarding the most problematic and 
pressing issues; war crimes, ethnically motivated attacks and corruption of public 
institution. Though there were extended reports on war crimes and ethnically 
motivated attacks in Kosovo3 the numbers of court cases that addressed or 
adjudicated this phenomenon were insignificant. What would happen within the 
society of Kosovo if perpetrators of these crimes would be judged and sentenced? 
Would this help heal the wounds of a society that emerged from the war? Would it- 
judging those who committed ethnically motivated crimes - helped in creation of a 
sense of community and unification of society against those individual criminals and 
help build trust amongst ethnic groups? Again we will never know, we can only 
assume what if? Ineffectiveness to bring justice by local justice in local courts-which 
by the way was administered by the international community-to war crimes and 
ethnically motivated crimes helped in further division amongst ethnic lines in the 
Kosovo society. Yet ironically as evidence in this section shows there were 
concentrated efforts to reinforce the concept of multi-ethnicity in the public 
institutions as a mean of political stability and to increase the legitimacy of the 
institutions.  
Another factor that diminishes the legitimacy of public institutions is the corruption 
of public officials. Corruption poses risks to political legitimacy and stability in the 
society. Reports and leaked documents show that those policies to tackle allegations 
on corruption hardly ever made it to the court, instead some administrative bodies 
within UNMIK dealt and gave sometimes even strange recommendations on how to 
deal with an allegation on corruption4. Anti-corruption initiatives and court cases 
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that would harshly punish such practices would strengthen legitimacy of the public 
institutions and trust on them, a necessary component for social cohesion. Yet they 
were largely missing during the UNMIK era in Kosovo. This reluctance to fight 
corruption and to strengthen the judiciary in this fight is another factor that leads to 
a general mistrust of the general public in public institutions in Kosovo. 
Yet, the biggest and the most determinant deficiency of the international 
administration in Kosovo under United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in my 
view was lack of clarity on what the final status of Kosovo would be. UNMIK was 
established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. The resolution 
determined the role of UNMIK’s as overseeing the establishment of interim political 
institutions of self government “pending a final settlement “but never specifying 
what this settlement would entail. This vague approach towards the final status of 
Kosovo undermined all its credibility with the Albanians as majority in Kosovo and 
within the Kosovo Serb community as well, for “the key contestation in Kosovo, and 
the source of the previous conflict, was the competing claims over Kosovo’s 
sovereignty”1. The powers vested in UNMIK constituted a significant accentuation 
of anything the UN had ever previously undertaken2. On May 15, 2001, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General of UN in Kosovo signed UNMIK regulation 
2001/9 to approve the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government 
of Kosovo. The entry into force of this constitutional framework marks a new stage 
of self-government of Kosovo. This is the most important document approved by 
UNMIK, because it sets up the comprehensive legal framework for self-government 
institutions of Kosovo. The Constitutional Framework on Interim Self-Government 
in Kosovo describes and establishes institutions of self-government in Kosovo, the 
President of Kosovo, the Assembly, the government of Kosovo, local government, 
and the electoral system. This historic document was the basis for the people of 
Kosovo to establish democratic structures. The document was of a constitutive 
nature since it established the main organs of self government. It was an interim 
constitutional framework since it was meant to assist the process of determining 
Kosovo’s final status. At the time, however, it was argued that a “constructive 
ambiguity” surrounding Kosovo’s final status would facilitate the diminution of 
antagonistic claims on Kosovo and provide space for compromise3. In the other hand, 
unprecedented power was vested in UNMIK and in particular the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)4. While these extensive powers 
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2 See Michael M., United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies. In American Journal of 
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3 See Independent International Commission on Kosovo. The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International 
Response, Lessons Learned. Oxford University Press on Demand, 2000, p. 261.  
4 See Julie M., The Impact of Intervention on Local Human Rights Culture, in Anthony Lang (ed.) Just 
Intervention. Washington: Georgetown University Press, p. 162.  
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were legitimized at the time as a temporary arrangement, by 2003 UNMIK’s powers 
had in fact grown and were arguably greater than was required of an administration 
ostensibly mandated to promote self-government1. 
The ambiguity on the final status and the status quos in Kosovo was untenable by 
the end of 2003. This lead to introduction by UNMIK of policies that were ill 
constructed -”Standards before Status”2 and decentralization policies were later 
introduced, with the aim to move towards the final status of Kosovo. The “Standards 
before Status” policy was first introduced in 2003 and idea was that Kosovo’s final 
status would be addressed only after eight standards were achieved by the self 
government institutions of Kosovo. The standards describe a multiethnic society 
where there is democracy, tolerance, freedom of movement and equal access to 
justice for all people in Kosovo, regardless of their ethnic background.3 The eight 
standards assembled specific and ambitious targets and contained with provisions to 
ensure that the entire political system, the judiciary and the police reflect Kosovo’s 
ethnic diversity. The aim was to create „a democratic, tolerant, multi-ethnic Kosovo 
that will be at peace with itself and the rest of the region‟4. Yet even back then there 
were warnings that ‘support of the Kosovo Albanian-dominated Provisional 
Institutions for the concept and practice of multi-ethnicity remained inconsistent’5 
and ‘a lack of commitment among large segments of the Kosovo Albanian 
population to creating a truly multi-ethnic society in Kosovo’.6 Yet this was ignored 
and the policy moved forward, which made the policy and artificial constructs which 
had little practical utility, until it was openly questioned by the head of UN himself7. 
Literature review and empirical evidence suggests that interethnic accommodation 
is likely to be facilitated in two situations; first, where there are a large number of 
ethnic groups neither one of which is dominant, and the second, where there are a 
small number of large ethnic groups evidencing a high degree of geographical 
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dispersion and intermixing.1 In Kosovo neither situation exited in 1999 which 
constituted, Andrew Taylor to note that “a multi-ethnic society in which one ethnic 
group predominated, and which was spatially organized in ethnically homogenous 
electoral districts”2 based on the demographic evidence in Kosovo, and history of 
conflict in 1990’s, Taylor warned that “no amount of constitutional engineering or 
type of electoral system could, at this stage in Kosovo’s history, mitigate the 
bitterness and divisions in society”.3 The empirically based consideration of the 
situation was evidently overlooked by international community which continued to 
persist in a policy based on “aspirations and the international administration’s 
inflated sense of its own capacity”.4 From the beginning ethnicity was central to 
UNMIK’s organization of the local administration with the new arrangements for 
Kosovo’s political system and judiciary designed to ensure ethnic plurality through 
the use of ethnic quotas.5 
Analyzing constitutional design, politics and ethnic divisions in BiH Professor 
Marko argues that “the combination of entrenched and reinforced ethno-politics and 
the counter-productive institutions-building strategies of the international 
community were doomed to fail6. Moreover Professor Marko argues that; all forms 
of racism and ethno-nationalism are based on the same structural code…”7 He argues 
that only if the ideologically constructed and in no way “natural antagonism of 
equality and difference is transformed into a triadic structure of identity, equality and 
diversity without the alleged predetermination for conflict or cooperation, 
institutional diversity management becomes possible in order to reconcile political 
unity, legal equality and cultural diversity within one social and political system.8   
 
2. What Happened in Kosovo? A Brief History of Constitutional 
Development of Kosovo since the WWII 
Kosovo has tried to develop a constitutional identity of its own that is reflective of 
its particular history and the circumstances of its birth and development as a state, 
from a former part of an ex communist country to an independent state. This 
constitutional identity hence represents a mix of aspirations and commitments 
expressive of Kosovo’s history. The constitutional identity is a dynamic concept; it 
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3 See Taylor, A., supra note 2, p. 111. 
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5 See Hehir, A., supra note 1, p 12. 
6 For more on constitutional design and role of external factors on it, politics and ethnic divisions in 
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“evolves in ongoing political and interpretative activities occurring in courts, 
legislatures and other public and private domains1.  
The two topics –constitutional law and state building-are interrelated in many 
different ways. The constitutional history of Kosovo has played a role and has 
impacted the current institutional choices in the constitution of Kosovo of 2008. One 
of the aims of this study is to show transformation of Kosovo society from a monist 
and communist system into a plural democratic society, which has been rather 
different from other former communist societies. Most importantly this is an analysis 
of the international community’s efforts to reinforce the multiethnic concept in the 
Kosovan society through the creation of institutions of self government in Kosovo 
from 1999 until the declaration of independence in 2008. Last but not least the 
constitutional history of Kosovo is important as it informs us about the constitutional 
heritage of Kosovo which without any doubt impacted the current constitutional 
system in Kosovo.  
The history of constitutional developments of Kosovo has its origins after World 
War II.2 There is no doubt that the knowledge of the history of the Albanian and 
Serbian relations and differences over Kosovo do help in understanding Kosovo’s 
constitutional history and current state of affairs in Kosovo. Political history cannot 
really be separated from the constitutional history of Kosovo; nonetheless I will try 
to explain in brief only the constitutional and legal developments of Kosovo after 
World War II. 
From 31 January 1946 until today, Kosovo has gone through these main stages in its 
constitutional development: 
a) Kosovo’s constitutional development in the era of former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia3 from 1946 to 1989; 
b) Kosovo’s constitutional development from 1989 to 1999; 
c) Kosovo's constitutional development from June 1999 to February 2008- 
placement of Kosovo under the legal regime of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSEC) 1244; Kosovo under United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) administration;  
                                                        
1 See Jacobsohn, Gary J. (2011). The formation of constitutional identities. In Tom Ginsburg & 
Rosalind Dixon, eds. Comparative constitutional law. Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 129. 
2 Serbia took control of Kosovo in 1912. Most of the population of Kosovo was Albanian. In all official 
census, the Serbian population in Kosovo never reached above 24% of the general population in 1919. 
Due to the Serb settlement policy, the number of Albanians initially diminished, but the settlement 
policy proved to be ineffective and the Albanian population in Kosovo increased over time. For more 
information on the History of Kosovo see (Malcolm, 1998, pp. 252-285). 
3 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the Yugoslav state that existed from its foundation 
in the aftermath of World War II until its dissolution in 1992 amid the Yugoslav Wars. 
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d) Declaration of Independence on 17th February 2008 and the adoption of the 
Constitution of Kosovo; 
In this period SFRY absorbs Kosovo1 and places it formally within the structure of 
a Republic-Serbia, which in itself is an uncommon even strange legal and political 
solution of organizing a federal state. The main and highest organs of state power in 
Kosovo during this period were the People’s Council, the Provincial Executive 
Council and provincial administration bodies. While in this period, Kosovo did not 
enjoy autonomy in the judicial sphere23.  
Kosovo under the constitutional regime of 1946 was characterized by three legal-
political acts that are most important: the Constitution of SFRY of January 31, 1946, 
the Constitution of Serbia of January 1947 and the Statute of the Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo-Metohija of 23 May 1948. In this period of constitutional 
development, Kosovo had vague political subjectivity within the Yugoslav 
Federation, expressed amongst others in its direct representation in the National 
Assembly of the SFRY45.  
During this period discrimination against Albanians6 was visible especially in public 
life, as Serbs and Montenegrins, who represented 27.5% of Kosovo’s population, 
occupied 68%7 of positions in public service8. This led to massive demonstrations of 
Albanians in Kosovo who demanded change in 1968, openly calling for the creation 
                                                        
1 When the Axis powers occupied Yugoslavia in 1941, Kosovo became part of Albania, which was 
itself controlled by Italy. With the defeat of the Axis powers, Yugoslavia, then ruled by Communists 
led by Josip Broz Tito, regained control over Kosovo. For details on the legal status of Albania during 
the Second World War. See (Sereni, 1941, pp. 311–317).  
2 In the territory of Kosovo were formed four district courts and county courts as the second instance 
court, and there was no Supreme Court as the highest judicial instance at this period of time.  
3 See Article 2 of the 1946 Constitution. In Marc Weller, The crisis in Kosovo: 1989-1999 (1999). Vol. 
1, Documents and Analysis, p. 52. 
4 See Constitution of Social Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, Article 54. 
5 The Constitutional Law which was approved on January 13, 1953, followed subsequently with a 
similar constitutional law approved in Serbia resulted in deterioration of the legal and political status 
of Kosovo. This is mainly due to the significant weakening of the position and the treatment of 
Kosovo’s rights and duties within the federation; not as the rights that derived from the Yugoslav 
federation, but as authorizations, which were to be transferred by the Republic (of Serbia) to Kosovo 
authorities. This change occurred via Article 113 and 114 of the Constitutional Law on the Basis of 
Social and Political Organization of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and Federal Bodies 
of Power which was approved on January 13, 1953. 
6 See Kosovo under Autonomy, 1974 – 1990, published at 
https://www.cla.purdue.edu/si/Team1Reporte.pdf. 
7 The Kosovo census data after WWII reveal the following demographic situation: in 1948, Albanians 
68.5%, Serbs 23.6%, Montenegrins 3.9%; in 1953, Albanians 64.9%, Serbs 23.6%, Montenegrins 3.9%; 
in 1961, Albanians 67.2%, Serbs 23.6%, Montenegrins 3.9%; in 1971, Albanians 73.7%, Serbs 18.4%, 
Montenegrins 2.5%; in 1981, Albanians 77.4%, Serbs 13.2%, Montenegrins 1.7%; and in 1991, 
Albanians 82.2%, Serbs 9.9%, Montenegrins 1%. See Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: a short history, p. 316. 
Other categories in the censuses include Muslims, Turks, Roma, and Croats.  
8 See Malcolm, N., supra note 30, p. 323. 
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of the Republic of Kosovo, equal to the other constituent republics within the 
framework of socialist Yugoslavia. 
The new Constitution of FSRY of 1974 marks a turning point in improving the 
position of the Albanians in general and political and constitutional status of Kosovo 
within the FSRY. They mark the first departure of Kosovo’s constitutional position 
in the frames of multi-nationality of the former Yugoslav federation. In effect, the 
federal constitution of 1974 gave Kosovo de facto republican status, but not de jure 
status12. 
The new Constitution of SFRY of 1974 was an expression of internal self-
determination whereby federal units were given wide powers for the exercise of 
effective control over their respective territories3. In terms of legal developments, 
Kosovo had its own Constitution, the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court, its 
own Parliament and Executive Committee; it had its own representatives in both the 
SFRY Chamber of Republics and Provinces and the Federal Chamber and was also 
represented in the Federal Presidency4. 
The constitutional choices made in the Constitution the SFRY of 1974 and 
subsequently SAP Kosovo Constitution of the same year, de facto regarded Kosovo 
as the subject and constitutive element of federalism in Yugoslavia, with similar 
rights (but not completely equal) with the other federal Republics5. Kosovo had its 
representatives in all government and federal institutions; participation in the 
implementation of legislative functions and other executive functions at the level of 
the Federation6; equal participation with other federal units in the processes of 
extraction and change from the Constitution of the SFRY of 1974; and finally in its 
                                                        
1 See Kosovo under Autonomy, 1974 – 1990, published at 
https://www.cla.purdue.edu/si/Team1Reporte.pdf. 
2 See (Krieger, 2001, p. 2). Article 1 of Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
reads: “The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state having the form of a state 
community of voluntary united nations and their Socialist Republics and of the Socialist Autonomous 
Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which are constituent parts of the Republic of Serbia, based on 
the power of self-management by the working class and all working people; it is at the same time a 
socialist self-management democratic community of working people and citizens and of nations and 
nationalities having equal rights. 
3 See Vidmar, J., International legal responses to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. In Vand. J. 
(2009). Transnat'l L, 42, p. 779. 
4 See Article 4 of the 1974 of the Constitution. In Heike Krieger, The Kosovo conflict and international 
law: an analytical documentation 1974-1999, supra note 106, p. 3. 
5 Article 301 provides, inter alia: As the principal subject of the rights and duties of the Province, the 
Assembly shall directly and exclusively: 1. decide on amendments to the Constitution of S.A.P. Kosovo 
and approve the amendments to the Constitution of the S.F.R.Y. and the Constitution of the SR Serbia; 
18. consent to the alteration of the territory of the S.A.P. Kosovo; 19. elect and relieve of office the 
delegation of the Assembly of the S.A.P. Kosovo to the Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the 
Assembly of the S.F.R.Y.; 20. elect and relieve of office the member of the Presidency of the S.F.R.Y. 
from the S.A.P. Kosovo. 
6 See Article 291 in Krieger, H., supra note 69.  
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responsibility for its own development and the development of the federation as a 
whole1. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
noted that: “this Constitution gave the provinces a significant degree of autonomy, 
which included the power to draft their own constitutions, to have their own 
constitutional courts, to have a representative in the SFRY Presidency in Belgrade, 
and the right to initiate proceedings before the Constitutional Courts of Yugoslavia 
and Serbia. In addition, they were represented, along with the republics, in the SFRY 
Chamber of Republics and Provinces and the Federal Chamber, which was the 
legislative body with the power to amend the SFRY Constitution”2.  
The Constitution of 1974 established what could be called a hybrid3 constitutional 
position for Kosovo in the framework of the Federation of the former Yugoslavia, a 
constituent part of it and at the same time structured within Serbia. According to 
Article 245 of the 1974 Constitution the nations and nationalities of the SFRY had 
equal rights4 and brought full equalization of the institutions of the Republics and 
Socialist Autonomous Provinces (SAPs).  
However, the new political landscape created with the Constitution of 1974 in fact 
did not meet Albanians aspirations for a Republic of Kosovo within the Yugoslav 
Federation. On the other hand Serbian constitutional lawyers claimed that 
asymmetric federalism was discriminating against the Socialist Republic of Serbia. 
In the infamous SANU Memorandum5 complained that Serbs were discriminated 
against by Yugoslavia's constitutional structure of 1974 and argued for a 
fundamental reorganization of the state. In 1988 and 1989, the Serbian assembly 
prepared amendments to Serbia’s constitution that would profoundly impact the 
legal status of Kosovo’s autonomy. To do so, however, required the assembly of 
Kosovo to vote and accept these amendments6. Because Kosovo’s autonomy was 
established within the federal constitutional order, Serbia could not independently 
interfere with this status7. However, due to police intimidation on the eve of the vote 
                                                        
1 See Article 348, (regulating the federal government); and article 381 (regulating the constitutional 
court) in Krieger, H., The Kosovo conflict and international law: an analytical documentation 1974-
1999, supra note 69. 
2 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebrojša Pavković, 
Vladimir Lazarević, Sreten Lukić (hereinafter Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al.), Case No. IT-05-87-T, 
Judgment of 26 February 2009, Vol. I, pp. 83-84, par. 213, available on the ICTY website: 
http://www.icty.org/case/milutinovic/4#tjug (last accessed on November 2, 2015). 
3 I use the term hybrid to describe the constitutional situation were Kosovo at the same time was 
constituent part of Yugoslav Federation and being formally placed within the Constitution of Serbia.  
4 See Krieger, H., supra note 69, p. 3. 
5 The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts is a document produced by a 
committee of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts from 1985 to 1986. Excerpts of the draft were 
published by Večernje novosti in September 1986.  
6 See Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1974), Article 301. 
7 See Vidmar, J., supra note 70, p. 787. 
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1 Kosovo’s deputies voted to accept the amendments. In a vote on March 1989, the 
Serbian Assembly accepted and formally confirmed the amendments as adopted by 
Kosovo’s Assembly2. The constitutional amendments were followed by laws and 
other measures such as: the law on the action of Republic bodies in special 
circumstances in Kosovo3 (approved on 3 June 1990 by Serbia Parliament); the law 
on invalidation of the activity of the Assembly of Kosovo and its government4 
(approved on 5 July 1990 by Serbia parliament); the law on labour relations in 
special circumstances (approved on 26 July 1990 by Serbia parliament)5. On the 
basis of that law, 135,000 Albanian workers were expelled from their jobs. All 
together, these laws accompanied by other decisions meant that public activities in 
the Albanian language were banned, starting with education, culture, science, and 
media, while Kosovan Albanian employees working in institutions such as schools, 
university, health institutions, media, police and other relevant sectors were fired en 
masse. Elementary School Law and Secondary School Law adopted in 1992 made 
Serbian the language of instruction in Kosovo for both elementary and secondary 
schools6. The vote of the above mentioned laws and subsequent measures at the 
Serbian Assembly effectively terminated and abrogated the autonomy of Kosovo in 
an illegal way.  
Albanians in Kosovo opposed these actions by the Serbian parliament. On 2 July 
1990, 114 out of 118 members of the Kosovo Assembly who were elected as 
representatives of the people of Kosovo, met in front of the Assembly building, 
which they were not allowed to enter, and adopted a resolution-referred also as a 
Constitutional Declaration- declaring Kosovo “an equal and independent entity 
within the framework of the Yugoslav federation”7. Reacting to the resolution of 2 
July 1990, the Serbian Assembly dissolved Kosovo’s organs of self-government- the 
                                                        
1 See Ramet, S.P. (2006). The three Yugoslavias: state-building and legitimation, 1918-2005. Indiana 
University Press, p. 353. 
2 See Malcolm, N., supra note 30, p 344; (describing the autonomous status of Kosovo under the 1974 
Constitution). 
3 See Law on the Actions of Republic Agencies under Special Circumstances, 26 June 1990, Official 
Gazette of Socialist Republic of Serbia, 33/90. In Weller, Marc, ed. The crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999. 
Vol. 1, Documents and Analysis, pp. 60-61. 
4 See Law Terminating Work of the SAP of Kosovo Assembly and the Executive Council, 5 July 1990, 
Weller, Marc, Ed. The crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999. Vol. 1. Documents and Analysis, pp. 61-62. See 
also Serb Assembly Regulation on Implementing Law Terminating Work of SAP Kosovo Assembly 
and Executive Council, 13 July 1990. 
5 Law on Labour Relations under Special Circumstances, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 
No. 22/91. In Weller, Marc (1999). The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999. Documents and Analysis, 
Publishing Ltd, September, pp. 62-63. 
6 See Elementary School Law, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 50/92 and Secondary 
School Law, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 50/92, in Weller, M., Ed. The crisis in 
Kosovo 1989-1999. Vol. 1. Documents and Analysis, p. 63. 
7 See Malcolm, N. supra note 30 at p. 346. 
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Assembly and the government1. Through a series of other laws and unconstitutional 
acts it began the process of the political deinstitutionalization of Kosovo. 
The adoption of the Constitutional Declaration, by the Assembly of Kosovo was a 
legitimate and legal act of a legally elected representative body/authority of Kosovo 
under the Constitution of 1974. Seen from the historical perspective, the 
Constitutional Declaration reaffirmed the political will amongst the Albanian people 
of Kosovo for self-determination. The Declaration of  Independence of 2 July 1990 
is essentially a political act that contains the legal position and decision by the 
Assembly of Kosovo, to annul its previous decision to consent to constitutional 
amendments in the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (March 23, 1989), which 
seen from a procedural aspect did not even exist. The so called Constitution of the 
Republic of Kosovo-known also as Constitution of Kacaniku (Kushtetuta e 
Kacanikut)-with all accompanying documents; passed the Law on elections, as well 
as several other decisions necessary for the work of the Assembly of Kosovo. 
Adoption of this Constitution marked the culmination of the legitimate demands, 
which in political scene of Yugoslavia began to be articulated in the mass 
demonstrations of Albanians between 1968 and 1981 in which the primary and 
dominant political demand was the constitution of Kosovo as a republic with equal 
rights with the other republics of former Yugoslavia.  
The decision of the Assembly of Serbia to abolish the autonomy of Kosovo and to 
dissolve all state organs of self government were imposed via police and military 
force. Therefore discrimination along ethnic grounds against Albanians by the 
Serbian regime was daily policy in Kosovo; a de facto state of apartheid2 was 
installed via laws that aimed to change the demographic structure of the population 
of Kosovo3.  
Meanwhile, elsewhere in the federal Yugoslavia, the disintegration of the Yugoslav 
state had begun. Four federal units, via the referendums declared their intent to 
become independent countries and later passed their respective declarations of 
independence4. 
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia the political demands of Albanians changed5. 
Noticing the democratic movements elsewhere in the Yugoslav federation, on 2 July 
                                                        
1 See Malcolm, N. supra note 30 at p. 347. 
2 We know the term apartheid from South Africa-hence the definition of the term by the Oxford 
Dictionary is “a policy or system of segregation or discrimination on grounds of race”. I use the term 
to describe a similar state policy, official state policy of Serbia in Kosovo towards a specific ethnic 
group-Albanians, expressed in laws that were adopted by the Serb Parliament during this period.  
3 See Zakon o Posebnim Uslovima Prometa Nepokretnosti. Law on the Restriction of Real Property 
Transactions, Official Gazette of the SR Serbia No. 30/89, translated in Kosovo: law and politics, 
Kosovo in normative acts before and after 1974. 
4 In June 1991 Slovenia Declares Independence. In the same year Croatia and Macedonia declare their 
independence. In 1992, Bosna and Hercegovina Declares Independence. Author note.  
5 See Vidmar, J., supra note 70, p. 789. 
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1990 the Assembly of Kosovo adopted the Resolution proclaiming the Republic of 
Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state and decided to held referendum1. The 
referendum was held in Kosovo on 26 to 30 September 1991 and the absolute 
majority (almost 99% of voters from the 87% of the electorate that voted in the 
referendum) opted for a sovereign and independent state of Kosovo2. This 
declaration of independence of Kosovo was recognized only by Albania3.  
On April 27, 1992, Serbia and Montenegro created the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY). Notably, when the FRY was established, a federal status of 
Kosovo equal to that of Serbia and Montenegro was neither offered to nor demanded 
by Albanians4. 
In these circumstances Albanian elite organized themselves into political parties and 
set up cuasi governmental organizational structures always with the aim to 
implement the independence of Kosovo. In this environment, Kosovo Albanians 
organized not only parallel political institutions but also parallel systems of 
education and healthcare5. 
Historian and author Noel Malcolm describes the situation in Kosovo in the ‘90’s6: 
“To produce an adequate survey of the human rights abuses suffered by the 
Albanians of Kosovo since 1990 would require several long chapters in itself. Every 
aspect of life in Kosovo has been affected. Using a combination of emergency 
measures, administrative fiats and laws authorizing the dismissal of anyone who had 
taken part in one-day protest strike, the Serb authorities have sacked the 
overwhelming majority of those Albanians who had any form of state employment 
in 1990. Most Albanian doctors and health workers were also dismissed from the 
hospitals; deaths from diseases such as measles and polio have increased, with the 
decline in the number of Albanians receiving vaccinations. Approximately 6,000 
school-teachers were sacked in 1990 for having taken part in protests, and the rest 
were dismissed when they refused to comply with a new Serbian curriculum which 
largely eliminated teaching of Albanian literature and history” 
In 1995, the situation in Kosovo changed when the Bosnian issue was settled with 
the adoption of the Dayton accords that followed the limited use of force by NATO 
in relation to Bosnian Serb forces7. The failure of the Dayton accords to address the 
Kosovo issue made it clear to Kosovo Albanians that the Kosovo issue would not be 
addressed through similarly decisive measures. In reaction to the increased human 
rights violation and the hesitation to address the issue of Kosovo, the Kosovo 
                                                        
1 See Weller, M., ed. p Supra note 86, pp. 17; 64-65.  
2 See (Vickers, & John, 1998, p. 251). 
3 See (Crawford, 2006, p. 408). 
4 See Vidmar, J., supra note, 70, p. 789. 
5 See Malcolm, N., supra note 30, p. 349. 
6 See Malcolm, N., supra note 30, p. 349. 
7 See (Weller & Wolff, 2005, p. 245).  
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Liberation Army (KLA) emerged. This was a guerrilla like armed group. The 
situation quickly evolved into a full war between the KLA and Serbian and 
Yugoslavian military and police1. 
Weller posts that international engagement with Kosovo was half-hearted and 
sporadic, despite the fact that the importance of Kosovo to stability in the wider 
Balkans was widely acknowledged2. The war in Kosovo resembled the scenes 
already seen in Bosnian war. In February 1999, an internationally-sponsored3 
conference was convened in Rambouillet, France and gathered representatives of 
Kosovo Albanians and representatives of the Yugoslav government. The aim of the 
conference was to provide a political solution to the conflict, or as the document 
itself suggests an interim agreement for peace and self-government in Kosovo4. The 
Rambouillet agreement was organized with the aim of ending the violence in Kosovo 
and facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons. The Kosovo delegation 
eventually accepted this arrangement, since it did not prejudice its claim to self-
determination and provided there would be a process allowing for the ultimate option 
of independence after the expiry of the three years term agreed-upon as interim 
period5. The agreement was rejected by the Serbian delegation. This rejection by the 
Serbian delegation and the escalation of the war in Kosovo prompted the 
Humanitarian Intervention by NATO6 against the Serbian military targets on 24th 
March 1999. On 10 June 1999 the United Nations Security Council approved 
Resolution 1244/1999, placing Kosovo under the international administration of the 
United Nations Mission Interim in Kosovo, (UNMIK). One of the tasks of UNMIK 
was “to help the people in Kosovo to rebuild their lives and heal the wounds of 
conflict”7 
On February 17th 2008, Kosovo was proclaimed a sovereign and independent state 
at an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly of Kosovo. The Declaration of 
Independence was an Act of the Assembly as an institution of the Provisional Self-
                                                        
1 See Weller, M. & Wolff, S., supra note 99, p. 246. 
2 See Weller, M. (1989, p 33).  
3 The six-nation “Contact Group,” comprised of delegations from the United States, Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Russia, meets in London to discuss a resolution to the Kosovo conflict. At the 
conclusion of the conference, they issue an ultimatum to the Yugoslavian government and Kosovor 
Albanians, requiring them to attend peace talks in Rambouillet, France beginning on February 6 (see 
February 6-23, 1999). London: Press Association, 1/29/1999; BBC, 1/30/1999. 
4 The full text of the Rambouillet Agreement is available online at: 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html (last accessed on November 15 
2015). 
5 See Weller, M. & Wolff, S., supra note 99, p. 245. 
6 For more on the humanitarian Intervention see Christopher, G. (2002). Humanitarian intervention: 
the case of Kosovo, pp. 141-175. 
7 For more on the nature of UNMIK and its role see Reka, B., UNMIK as an international governance 
within post-conflict society, in New Balkan Politics 7/8 (2003). 
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Government, adopted unanimously by all members of the assembly present, 109 
members.  
On April 8, 2008, the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo was signed by the 
President of the Republic of Kosovo the next day on April 9, 2008, draft Constitution 
of the Republic of Kosovo was ratified by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. 
April 15, 2008 - The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo was fully enacted as 
the highest legal act of the Republic of Kosovo. The Constitution of Kosovo of 2008 
originally with 154 articles in fourteen chapters. has been amended twice so far with 
AMENDMENTS I - XXII1 and AMENDMENT XXIII2 and now it has total of 162 
articles. Its provisions are of both the formal legal nature and regulate substantial 
matters of the state. It contains a dedicated Chapter on fundamental rights and 
freedoms3. One of the characteristics of the Constitution, which represents 
advancement in the field of minority rights protection by a Constitution in the region 
and beyond4, is that it contains a special chapter dedicated to the rights of non 
majority communities and their members5. The constitutional history of Kosovo 
should have impelled the constitutional designers of the new constitutional order to 
produce a text that would ensure both the highest standards of human rights, and 
ensure the adherence of the citizens of Kosovo to the new constitutional order as 
well as to guarantee that all the citizens of Kosovo would be involved in the political 
decision making process regardless of ethnicity, religion or race. The Constitution 
of 2008 determines the procedure for constitutional amendments and it outlines in 
detail the modus of transition from the old legal order into the new one. 
 
Conclusion  
Ethno nationalism/ethnocentrism has continued to grow in Kosovo, and 
ethnocentrism - is a source of constant tension in the process of state-building in 
Kosovo which threatens to impact structural functionality of the institutions and 
threatens to destabilize the entire constitutional system. Over the course of 
negotiating the final status of Kosovo, it became clear to the political elites in 
Kosovo, who represented the majority of population i.e ethnic Albanians, that the 
independence of Kosovo would be possible only if they were ready to offer the 
highest legal and institutional mechanisms for enabling political participation for all 
ethnic communities that are not in majority in Kosovo, so as to provide the highest 
standards for the protection of human rights of communities/minorities. The 
                                                        
1 See Official Gazette of Republic of Kosovo no.25, date 7 September 2012. 
2 See Official Gazette of Republic of Kosovo no.7, date 26 march 2013. 
3 See Constitution of Kosovo (2008) Chapter II. Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. 
4 For example none of the Constitutions of the countries that emerged independent from SFRY contains 
such chapter.  
5 See Constitution of Kosovo (2008) Chapter III [Rights of Communities and their members] Article 57  
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international community involved in mediation of the final status of Kosovo did not 
want to help create a new state that would turn against its citizens and abuse their 
rights. Therefore participation in decision making process by the non-majority ethnic 
communities was important to the political elite in Kosovo to ensure the institutional 
design of the new state enjoyed full legitimacy. Externally this was important to 
show to the international community the readiness of the political elite to embrace 
the highest standards of democracy and protection of minority rights so the new state 
of Kosovo would get international recognition and acceptance by the international 
community of the states. On the other hand during the negotiating process, Serbia 
vowed to ensure an ethnic entity for Serbs of Kosovo, while refusing to recognize 
and accept the independence of Kosovo. In their political platform they argued for a 
political entity of Serbs within Kosovo akin to the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Such an entity would undoubtedly have made the entire institutional 
design dysfunctional and ultimately would likely have rendered Kosovo a failed 
state. This in return would have had repercussions for democracy and human rights 
on the ground. That proposal was ultimately rejected by both the international 
community and the Kosovon delegation, but did they ultimately fall into the similar 
trap by creating ethnically based municipalities? The evidence suggests so. And this 
is one of the main obstacles towards creation of the common inclusive identity of 
Kosovans. For, in my view, the Constitution is of outmost importance to secure both 
democracy and stability in a society, especially those that are divided along ethnic 
lines; to ensure the political participation of all ethnic groups on the one hand by 
providing fundamental human rights protection by the highest legal act of a polity 
and to ensure functional institutional mechanism to achieve it. 
  
